MANET增强合作模型的理论研究

doi:10.13190/jbupt.200805.21.zhenghf

北京邮电大学学报 ›› 2008, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (5): 21-24.doi: 10.13190/jbupt.200805.21.zhenghf

MANET增强合作模型的理论研究

郑慧芳, 蒋挺, 周正

北京邮电大学无线网络实验室, 北京 100876

收稿日期:2007-07-16 修回日期:1900-01-01 出版日期:2008-10-30 发布日期:2008-10-30
通讯作者: 郑慧芳

Theoretical Study with the Model for MANET Cooperation Enforcement

ZHENG Hui-fang, JIANG Ting, ZHOU Zheng

Wireless Network Laboratory, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China)

Received:2007-07-16 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2008-10-30 Published:2008-10-30
Contact: ZHENG Hui-fang

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

为了解决移动Ad hoc网络(MANET)中因保存能量而拒绝合作的节点自私性问题，对刺激合作的激励模型进行了研究，提出了将经济学上的委托——代理关系应用到Ad Hoc网络的发报方与参与转发数据包的节点上. 利用简化的博弈原理，使合作双方虚拟货币收支达到一定的纳什平衡. 模型将刺激合作方案设计转化为发报方的最优激励合同设计问题，从而在理论上保证发报方以最小的成本设计一种机制，促使转发节点尽力工作，在一定程度上抑制了合作中的自私性行为.

关键词: Ad hoc, 自私性, 委托——代理, 纳什平衡, 博弈

Abstract:

To solve the selfishness problems caused in energy saving in Mobile Ad hoc NETwork (MANET), an incentive model is studied by introducing the principal-agent theory into the relationship between the source nodes and the participating nodes. The income and outcome of both sides can reach the Nash equilibrium by using the simple game theory. This model changes the cooperation plan designing into the optimal incentive contract designing, with which the source nodes will theoretically take the lowest cost for making the participating nodes work hard. Therefore the selfishness can restrained to a certain degree.

Key words: Ad hoc, selfishness, principal-agent, Nash equilibrium, game theory

中图分类号:

TP393.08

郑慧芳, 蒋挺, 周正. MANET增强合作模型的理论研究[J]. 北京邮电大学学报, 2008, 31(5): 21-24.

ZHENG Hui-fang, JIANG Ting, ZHOU Zheng. Theoretical Study with the Model for MANET Cooperation Enforcement[J]. JOURNAL OF BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF POSTS AND TELECOM, 2008, 31(5): 21-24.

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MANET增强合作模型的理论研究

Theoretical Study with the Model for MANET Cooperation Enforcement

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