北京邮电大学学报

  • EI核心期刊

北京邮电大学学报 ›› 2011, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (4): 75-79.doi: 10.13190/jbupt.201104.75.wangl

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

高能效功率控制博弈中的斯塔克尔伯格均衡

王雷,许文俊,牛凯,贺志强,林家儒   

  1. 北京邮电大学 泛网无线通信教育部重点实验室, 北京 100876
  • 收稿日期:2010-11-17 修回日期:2011-03-31 出版日期:2011-08-28 发布日期:2011-07-18
  • 通讯作者: 王雷 E-mail:raywonder@qq.com
  • 基金资助:

    国家重点基础研究发展计划项目(2009CB320401); 教育部博士点基金项目(20090005110003); 中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目(BUPT2009RC0111)

Stackelberg Equilibrium in EnergyEfficient Power Control Games

  • Received:2010-11-17 Revised:2011-03-31 Online:2011-08-28 Published:2011-07-18
  • Contact: Lei WANG E-mail:raywonder@qq.com

摘要:

提出了一种针对高能效功率控制博弈框架的新观点. 在假设存在更智慧用户的前提下,引入了斯塔克尔伯格均衡(SE)表示博弈结果,证明了SE比纳什均衡(NE)效率更高,并且不需要增加网络的协助. 所提观点和方案可视为认知用户根据认知信息改善系统总体性能的实例. 仿真结果表明,SE比NE具有更高的效率. 与NE相比,在SE时所有用户的效用有了显著增加,发射功率也有了明显下降.

关键词: 高效能功率控制, 纳什均衡, 斯塔克尔伯格均衡, 认知无线网络

Abstract:

A new viewpoint is proposed for the energyefficient power control games framework. Under the assumption that more intelligent users present, The Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) is introduced to represent the game results. It is proved that SE is superior to Nash equilibrium (NE) in terms of efficiency without any more network assistance. The proposed viewpoint and scenario can be regarded as a case that system overall performance is improved with help of cognitive knowledge being exploited by cognitive user. Simulation shows that, when in SE, all users can get more remarkable utility increase with decreased power than in NE. 

Key words: energyefficient power control, Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium, cognitive radio networks

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