北京邮电大学学报

  • EI核心期刊

北京邮电大学学报 ›› 2011, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (3): 71-74.doi: 10.13190/jbupt.201103.71.wuq

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

标准模型下基于身份的强不可伪造签名方案

吴青1,张乐友2   

  1. 1西安邮电学院 自动化学院, 西安 710121; 2西安电子科技大学 数学系, 西安 710071
  • 收稿日期:2010-08-26 修回日期:2011-03-15 出版日期:2011-06-28 发布日期:2011-03-29
  • 通讯作者: 吴青 E-mail:xidianwq@yahoo.com.cn
  • 基金资助:

    国家自然科学基金项目(61075055,60974082); 陕西省自然科学基金项目(2010JQ8004); 西安邮电学院青年基金项目(1100402)

New Strongly Unforgeable IdentityBased Signature  Scheme in the Standard Model

Qing Wu   

  • Received:2010-08-26 Revised:2011-03-15 Online:2011-06-28 Published:2011-03-29
  • Contact: Qing Wu E-mail:xidianwq@yahoo.com.cn

摘要:

为了克服已有方案安全性依赖强、签名长度长、计算代价大等缺陷,提出了一种可将任意基于身份的具有分〖JP9〗割-〖JP〗可模拟的存在性不可伪造的方案转化为强不可伪造签名方案的转化方案;在Paterson方案的基础上设计了标准模型下一种有效的基于身份的强不可伪造签名. 在计算DiffieHellman困难问题的假设下,证明该方案在适应性选择消息攻击下是强存在性不可伪造的. 与已有基于身份的强不可伪造签名方案相比,该方案签名长度短,计算量小,且有更强的安全性.

关键词: 强不可伪造签名, 基于身份签名, 标准模型, 可证明安全

Abstract:

To overcome the shortcomings of the existing schemes such as strong hardness assumption,long signatures and high compution cost, a new transformation is proposed. It can convert any simulativepartitioned identitybased signature with existentially unforgeable security to a strongly unforgeable signature. And a concrete strongly unforgeable identitybased signature based on Paterson’s scheme is constructed in the standard model. Under computational DiffieHellman assumption, the proposed signature scheme is provably secure against strongly existential forgery under adaptive chosen message attacks. In addition, the new scheme has some advantages over the available schemes, such as short signatures, low computation cost and high security.

Key words: strongly unforgeable signature, identitybased signature, standard model, provable security

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