北京邮电大学学报

  • EI核心期刊

北京邮电大学学报 ›› 2016, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (4): 103-107.doi: 10.13190/j.jbupt.2016.04.020

• 研究报告 • 上一篇    下一篇

基于债务的机会网络“物-物交换”激励机制

姚建盛1,2, 马春光1, 袁琪1   

  1. 1. 哈尔滨工程大学 计算机科学与技术学院, 哈尔滨 150001;
    2. 吉林师范大学 计算机学院, 吉林 四平 136000
  • 收稿日期:2015-12-23 出版日期:2016-08-28 发布日期:2016-06-27
  • 作者简介:姚建盛(1980-),男,博士生,E-mail:yaojiansheng@hrbeu.edu.cn;马春光(1974-),男,教授,博士生导师.
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(61472097);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助课题(博导类)(20132304110017);黑龙江省自然科学基金项目(F201229)

A Debt-Based Barter Trade Incentive Mechanism in Opportunistic Networks

YAO Jian-sheng1,2, MA Chun-guang1, QUAN Qi1   

  1. 1. College of Computer Science and Technology, Harbin Engineering University, Harbin 150001, China;
    2. College of Computer, Jilin Normal University, Jilin Siping 136000, China
  • Received:2015-12-23 Online:2016-08-28 Published:2016-06-27

摘要: 针对机会网络简单“物-物交换”(SBT)激励机制降低网络性能的问题,设计了一种基于债务的“物-物交换”(DBT)激励机制. DBT通过引入债务关系改变了SBT中严格的等价交换原则,增加了单次交易的转发数据量,从而提高了网络性能. 为使债务关系可靠运行,设计了基于信任的惩罚机制和基于债务的缓存策略. 仿真实验证明,和SBT相比,DBT在有效激励节点协作的同时提高了网络性能.

关键词: 机会网络, 自私, "物-物交换"激励机制, 债务

Abstract: In order to solve the problem that existing simple barter trade(SBT) incentive mechanisms in opportunistic networks degrade the network performance, a debt-based barter trade(DBT) incentive mechanism was proposed. The DBT changes the rigid equivalent barter trade principal in SBT by introducing debt relationship, which increases the number of forwarding data in a single trade and then improves the network performance. A trust-based punishment scheme and a debt-based caching strategy was designed to guarantee that debt relationship credibly run. Simulations show that DBT can obtain better network performance than SBT and effectively motivate nodes' cooperations.

Key words: opportunistic networks, selfishness, barter trade incentive mechanisms, debt

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