Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications

  • EI核心期刊

JOURNAL OF BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF POSTS AND TELECOM ›› 2008, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (5): 21-24.doi: 10.13190/jbupt.200805.21.zhenghf

• Papers • Previous Articles     Next Articles

Theoretical Study with the Model for MANET Cooperation Enforcement

ZHENG Hui-fang, JIANG Ting, ZHOU Zheng   

  1. Wireless Network Laboratory, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China)
  • Received:2007-07-16 Revised:1900-01-01 Online:2008-10-30 Published:2008-10-30
  • Contact: ZHENG Hui-fang

Abstract:

To solve the selfishness problems caused in energy saving in Mobile Ad hoc NETwork (MANET), an incentive model is studied by introducing the principal-agent theory into the relationship between the source nodes and the participating nodes. The income and outcome of both sides can reach the Nash equilibrium by using the simple game theory. This model changes the cooperation plan designing into the optimal incentive contract designing, with which the source nodes will theoretically take the lowest cost for making the participating nodes work hard. Therefore the selfishness can restrained to a certain degree.

Key words: Ad hoc, selfishness, principal-agent, Nash equilibrium, game theory

CLC Number: