Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications

  • EI核心期刊

JOURNAL OF BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF POSTS AND TELECOM ›› 2014, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (2): 1-4.doi: 10.13190/j.jbupt.2014.02.001

    Next Articles

An Analysis of the Construction of XOR-MAC and a Proof for Its Security

XU Jin1,2, WEN Qiao-yan1, WANG Da-yin3   

  1. 1. State Key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing 100876, China;
    2. Beijing Electronic Science and Technology Institute, Beijing 100070, China;
    3. Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100093, China
  • Received:2013-05-01 Online:2014-04-28 Published:2014-04-08

Abstract:

In order to study the construction of XOR message authentication code (XOR-MAC), we analyse it from the view of universal Hash and pseudo-random function, using shared random funciton model. Firstly, XOR-MAC is splited into two parts: a pseudo-random funtion and an universal Hash. Secondly, this two parts can be proved to have certain properties. Finally, XOR-MAC is regarded as a kind of Carter-Wegman MAC by adopting a new method that applies a pseudo-random functions directly to the output of an universal Hash family. And we give a simple security proof of XOR-MAC based on information theory. The most important thing is that many new MACs can be easily constructed using this idea.

Key words: message authentication code, Carter-Wegman message authentication code, universal Hash family, pseudo-random functions

CLC Number: