Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications

  • EI核心期刊

JOURNAL OF BEIJING UNIVERSITY OF POSTS AND TELECOM ›› 2014, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (s1): 92-96.doi: 10.13190/j.jbupt.2014.s1.018

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Network Security Evaluation Based on Stochastic Game and Network Entropy

CHEN Yong-qiang1, WU Xiao-ping1, FU Yu1, SONG Yan2   

  1. 1. Department of Information Security, Naval University of Engineering, Wuhan 430033, China;
    2. Information Security Technology Key Laboratory, Beijing 100091, China
  • Received:2014-01-26 Online:2014-06-28 Published:2014-06-28
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Abstract:

A security evaluation based on network entropy and stochastic game was presented. An attack defense stochastic game model was proposed to describe the conflict of network security which is dynamic and multi-state. The concept of network entropy was introduced to describe network security performance. The optimal defense strategy and network state probability was obtained by solving the Nash equilibrium of attack defense stochastic game model. On this basis, the security of network was assessed combining with network states entropy difference. Network security evaluation algorithm was given at last. An example is representatively provided to show that the method can effectively assess the security of network and predict intrusion behavior.

Key words: network security, network entropy, stochastic game, confrontation model, intrusion effect

CLC Number: